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ABSTRACT 
 
Most social institutions are supposed to be relatively benign, so that if they did not exist, rational 
human beings would find it worthwhile to create them. It is comforting to believe that we have the 
social institutions we wish to have, and we wish to have them because they enhance the common 
good. The article claims that this belief is in some important cases either a self-delusion or a pious 
lie. The classic example is the state. We are taught that since it is necessary for efficient social 
coexistence, it should be regarded as if it were the result of a social contract we have voluntarily 
entered into. The law-and-economics school generalizes this type of approach in explaining customs 
and law. Customs and laws evolve in response to needs. They are what they are because they 
efficiently serve some purpose. Certain primitive customs are rationalized in this way. The article 
claims that some of these rationalizations are grossly implausible. One primitive custom, reciprocal 
gift-giving and hospitality, is alleged to be a mutual insurance scheme, an allegation there are 
strong reasons to doubt. This custom, then, is said to be the ancestor of the modern welfare state. 
Both the ancient custom and its modern equivalent are efficient because mutual insurance that 
redistributes risk is itself efficient. The article demonstrates that mutual insurance and the welfare 
state are different in essential respects, and the legitimising analogy is false. 
 
 
“If religion did not exist, it should be invented”. Obviously, Napoleon did not mean 
the crusading, fighting, furious and conquering kind of religion that subverts or 
overwhelms the civil order, but the sweet-tempered kind that educates the young, 
reconciles conflicts and promotes the virtues that make society easy to govern. Since 
his time, political thought has reached the same verdict about many other social 
institutions, finding that it is a good thing that they exist, and that if they did not, 
they should, and no doubt also would be invented. The main purpose of this article 
is to show that in some important cases, this is either self-delusion or a pious lie. It 
springs from a sub-conscious desire to justify the institutions that exist and that 
sometimes dominate our lives with their crushing weight. We want to tell ourselves, 
and our fellow citizens, that these institutions are efficient and in some sense 
contribute to the common good. Therefore it is reasonable to suppose that they did 
not happen to evolve by chance, blind historical accident, let alone through the 
perversity of social choice mechanisms against our will and interests. It is important 
for us to believe, and often even more important to make other people believe, that 
these institutions exist by our choice, and if they did not, we would choose to 
establish them from scratch. 
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The classic example of this type of argument is the contractarian theory of the state, 
which has become a widely accepted standard explanation. The state exists and 
enjoys the monopoly of the use of force for some reason, probably a historical one 
that we need not inquire about. What matters is that without the state, society could 
not function tolerably, if at all. Therefore all rational persons would choose to enter 
into a social contract to create it. Indeed, we should regard the state “as if” it were 
the result of our social contract, hence indisputably legitimate. 
However, there are many less widely known, and perhaps no less insidious, 
examples of delusion and pious lie. Consider the explanation of certain timeless 
customs. The law- and- economics school is fond of finding economic rationality 
behind a wide range of social phenomena, such as the evolution of the common law. 
It has also attempted to identify the search for efficiency as the source of law itself. 
(1)  
Thus, it examines a number of customs and customary laws that anthropologists 
have found prevalent among primitive peoples, hunter-gatherers and early 
cultivators, and it imputes an “as if” efficiency motive to each, that is to say it shows 
that the law in question is shaped as if its purpose were to increase efficiency or get 
rid of a source of inefficiency. For instance, it tells us that polygamy, by which it 
was the custom for wealthy men to take many wives, served to prevent political 
strife and the forming of tyrannical state-like institutions that were bad for economic 
efficiency. Wealthy men had a surplus of food; a surplus of food would enable them 
to attract and feed a band of young warriors; and commanding such a band, they 
could aim at political power. Since, however, they had many wives, the wives and 
their children ate the food and there was no surplus, hence no armed bands and no 
political power. The story omits to mention that if wealthy men take many wives, 
many young men are left without wives and may well become a source of political 
instability. The rationale furnished for several other customs can similarly be turned 
inside out. One, in particular, the custom of gift-giving and feasting, is particularly 
relevant today. 
It is argued that when a primitive family unit had a surplus of food, it held a feast 
and gave gifts of food to neighbouring families in the confident expectation that 
when for some reason game or fish became scarce and they suffered from a dearth 
of food, they would be invited to feasts and be given gifts of food in return for their 
earlier generosity. In fact, this custom worked as a mutual insurance policy against 
hunger, spreading the risk of it from the individual and the small group to the 
community. This alleged rationale, too, can be turned inside out by pointing out that 
the hunter has a surplus of game, and the fisherman a surplus of fish, at precisely the 
same time that his fellow tribesmen also have a surplus and least need his hospitality 
and gifts; while if game and fish get scarce, they get scarce more or less equally for 
the whole tribe. Everyone needs hospitality and gifts of food at the same time, and 
very few are in any position to offer it. Even if the giver of the gift thought he was 
getting valuable insurance and was therefore more than happy to follow the benign 
custom, the recipient of the gift must have feared that he would be called upon to 
return the gift when he could least afford to give away food. Therefore he was 
unlikely to be happy with the implicit transaction. Hence it is probably a distortion 
to describe the transaction as a voluntary exchange, a buying and selling of 
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insurance that satisfies both parties. If the custom had any “rational” motive, it must 
be found elsewhere and not in something any homo oeconomicus would be prepared 
to do even if no custom or law demanded it. 
Nevertheless, the idea that primitive man had a customary scheme of mutual 
insurance against hunger, and that this custom evolved and survived because 
everybody tangibly benefited from it, has an immense attraction. It is easy to 
overlook that it rests on an explanatory theory that is probably a fallacy, and it is 
easy to pardon it if this is not overlooked. The important thing for modern political 
thought is that the representation of society as a scheme of mutual insurance, with 
the state as the collector of the insurance premium, gains priceless legitimacy from 
the belief that the scheme has an ancestry that goes back to pre-history, and that it 
was a voluntarily adopted custom before it became, as it progressively did from the 
last third of the 19.century onward, a matter of the fiscal law of the welfare state. 
“Society is insurance” is a popular notion in contemporary politics, that gains some 
plausibility from the fact that such events as illness, accidents at work, 
unemployment, incapacity and old age are increasingly compensated by “society”. 
However, the plausibility is superficial. In a true mutual insurance scheme, there is a 
two-way flow of contributions and benefits; the two flows are roughly in balance 
taking one year with another; and the incidence of benefit payments is random, so 
that each contributor has as good a chance to pay in more into the scheme over a 
lifetime than he gets out of it  as he has to get out more from it than he pays in. In 
other words, gains and losses from the scheme are not systematic. No person or 
group is favoured and none is penalised by the terms of the insurance, over and 
above the gain everybody is supposed to reap from being insured. If such were in 
fact the case, everybody would be a gainer from the scheme ex ante, though ex post 
there would always be some gainers and some losers, distributed randomly. 
In reality, this is not at all how the scheme works. It is amazing to see the capacity 
for self-delusion and for the swallowing of pious lies, with which public opinion still 
accepts the idea of “society as insurance”. In the contemporary welfare state, far 
from having an equal chance of winning and losing from paying premiums and 
collecting benefits while generally profiting from feeling safe, the chances are 
decidedly unequal. The schemes of insurance have a built-in bias to favour certain 
social groups, hence necessarily to penalise the rest. 
Three major imbalances of this kind can be seen with the naked eye. The first 
divides society into two halves: on one side of the dividing line are the normally 
functioning two-parent families as well as the more able, the more industrious and 
provident, and the more lucky, while on the other side there are the unlucky, the 
uneducated, the feckless, the one-parent families and the widows and orphans. By 
and large, the former half avoids the events against which society insures them. By 
and large, the latter half gets hit by these events more often and more hard than the 
average.  By and large, the former half pays higher premiums than the latter, while 
in genuine insurance the contrary would be the case. The scheme of “society as 
insurance” is clearly designed to make the strong carry the weak. 
A multitude of arguments, most of them well known, can be advanced in defence of 
this arrangement. Some are well constructed, others are not, but most of them are 
honest. Each depends ultimately on the moral proposition that it is right and proper 
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to force one part of a society to serve, against its will, the interest and well-being of 
another part. The one argument that is patently dishonest is the one that I classify as 
a delusion or a pious lie, namely that it is really in the (long-term?) interest of the 
strong to be forced to help the weak, - that this upholds an insurance scheme that is 
efficient and to everyone’s benefit. (The “veil of uncertainty” argument is of this 
type). 
There are two other major imbalances. One results from insuring old-age pensions 
on a pay-as-you-go basis, i.e. by taking the line of least resistance. The method 
appears equitable, in that although everyone contributes to someone else’s pension 
rather than to his own (as he would in a funded scheme), every contributor can 
expect to become a beneficiary in due course.  The imbalance results from the 
retarded echoes of demographic shifts, such as the “baby boom”, and more 
persistently from the steady lengthening in life expectancy unaccompanied by a 
parallel lengthening of the life spent at work. The net effect has often been described 
as a gigantic time bomb that will explode within about two decades. It is now widely 
discussed and I need not elaborate on it except perhaps to say that any abandonment 
of pay-as-you-go is now described as the betrayal of solidarity between generations, 
- another pious lie. 
Finally, the third major imbalance in the universal scheme of insurance that society 
is supposed to embody is an endemic-looking excess of benefits over contributions 
taken as a whole. The visible symptom of this is the budget deficit of central and 
local governments and public social insurance services, - a deficit that is the line of 
least resistance for governments that wish to stay in power. Here, the present 
generation pays itself benefits in excess of contributions, shifting the burden to the 
next generation. In the nature of the case, it is impossible to say that members of 
future generations would voluntarily consent to carry this burden, and I believe it 
impossible to show that the imbalance is likely to be inter-generationally efficient, 
enhancing wealth and well-being. 
A simple, and indeed brutal, conclusion stands out. Opportunism, not efficiency, is 
the motive force of the most important collective choices. Substantially all 
redistributive functions undertaken by the state can be explained by the fact that 
while people have unequal abilities and resources, they have equal votes, and 
resources can be taken from some and given to others by voting for the transfer. This 
is a naked truth, and it is not pretty. It is perhaps only human, but insincere, to 
prettify it by pretending that the net effect of these enforced transfers is to make us 
all wealthier and safer. 
 
 
Notes 
 
(1) Both “search” and “efficiency” require qualification. The search need not be, and 
generally is not, purposive, deliberate, conscious, but its result is “as if” it had been. 
Efficiency is not used in any rigorous sense. It does not mean Pareto-optimality. The 
law-and-economics school employs it as a synonym for wealth-maximising, where 
wealth is just an aggregate, treated independently of its distribution among 
individuals. This usage is inconsistent with the treatment by the same school of 
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insurance schemes that redistribute risk as efficiency-enhancing, although they do 
not increase aggregate wealth. 
 
 
 
 
